

Mission Command in the Royal Air Force for Joint Operations: The Mediating Roles of Command Autonomy, Information Sharing, and Organizational Adaptability

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ABSTRACT

The increasing complexity of contemporary warfare has fundamentally altered the requirements imposed on military command and control systems. The expansion of the operational environment from individual service domains to interconnected multi-domain and joint environments has increased the importance of rapid decision-making, distributed information processing, organizational flexibility, and the ability of subordinate commanders to act under conditions of uncertainty. These developments have generated growing interest in mission command as an alternative to rigidly centralized approaches to command and control. The United Kingdom represents an important case in this context because mission command has long constituted a central component of British military doctrine and continues to be embedded within contemporary UK defence and joint operational thinking. This study examines mission command in the Royal Air Force (RAF) from a joint operations perspective. Rather than treating mission command solely as a doctrinal principle or command philosophy, the study conceptualizes it as a mechanism through which command authority, information flows, and organizational behavior interact to influence joint operational effectiveness. A conceptual framework is therefore developed around five principal constructs: mission command, command autonomy, information sharing, organizational adaptability, and joint operational effectiveness. The framework proposes that mission command influences operational effectiveness not only directly, but also indirectly through the enhancement of subordinate command autonomy, the facilitation of timely information sharing, and the development of organizational adaptability. The study employs qualitative doctrinal analysis, conceptual analysis, and comparative interpretation of British and NATO military doctrine. Particular attention is given to the relationship between commander's intent, delegated authority, mutual trust, decision-making speed, information integration, and organizational adaptation. The analysis demonstrates that mission command should not be understood as unrestricted decentralization or the abandonment of centralized coordination. Rather, it represents a conditional distribution of decision-making authority within a coherent framework of strategic direction, operational coordination, accountability, and risk management. The study further argues that command autonomy constitutes a critical mechanism through which mission command can translate doctrinal intent into tactical initiative. Information sharing provides the informational foundation necessary for subordinate commanders to make decisions consistent with higher-level objectives, while organizational adaptability determines whether command structures can adjust to changing operational circumstances without losing coherence. The interaction among these variables is particularly significant in joint and multinational operations, where differences in organizational cultures, command relationships, information systems, and national authorities may complicate decision-making. The RAF case suggests that the effectiveness of mission command depends less on the absolute degree of decentralization than on the quality of the relationship between centralized strategic direction and decentralized execution. A resilient joint command system therefore requires a balance between unity of purpose and flexibility of action, supported by mutual trust, interoperable information systems, adaptive organizational structures, and clearly defined authorities.



1. INTRODUCTION

The character of warfare is undergoing a profound transformation. Contemporary military operations are increasingly conducted within environments characterized by strategic uncertainty, rapid technological change, information saturation, contested communications, and the simultaneous interaction of multiple operational domains. Land, maritime, air, space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information activities are no longer conducted as isolated lines of effort. Instead, they increasingly interact to produce synchronized effects across a shared operational environment.

This transformation has created a fundamental challenge for military command and control. Command systems designed around relatively stable communication networks, hierarchical decision-making, and predictable operational sequences may encounter significant difficulties when confronted with rapidly changing situations in which information is incomplete, communications are disrupted, and opportunities may exist only for a limited period. The problem is therefore not simply how commanders can obtain more information, but how information can be transformed into timely and appropriate decisions at the level where action is actually required.

The United Kingdom provides an important case through which this transformation can be examined. The sixth edition of the UK Defence Doctrine identifies mission command as a fundamental mechanism through which the military instrument is employed. It defines mission command around the clear expression of commanders' intent and the freedom of subordinates to act in pursuit of that intent. Importantly, the doctrine characterizes mission command as a form of decentralized decision-making that promotes initiative and the ability to dictate tempo while remaining responsive to superior direction. It also explicitly associates mission command with integration and integrated action at operational and tactical levels. ([GOV.UK Assets](#))

This doctrinal position is particularly significant for the Royal Air Force. UK Air Power doctrine describes air power as an instrument whose effectiveness depends not only on its intrinsic characteristics but also on its relationship with other operational domains and with other elements of national and military power. It further recognizes the importance of multinational and partner relationships. ([GOV.UK](#)) Consequently, the RAF cannot be adequately examined as an isolated air force organization. Its command and control processes must be understood within broader joint, multinational, and increasingly multi-domain structures.

The contemporary joint environment introduces a paradox. On the one hand, joint operations require greater central coordination because effects produced by different forces and domains must be synchronized. On the other hand, the speed and complexity of modern operations make excessive centralization increasingly problematic. A command headquarters that attempts to control every tactical decision may become a bottleneck, particularly when subordinate units possess more immediate and relevant information than higher headquarters.

Mission command attempts to address this paradox by separating **the determination of purpose from the detailed determination of action**. Senior commanders establish objectives, priorities, intent, constraints, and acceptable levels of risk, while subordinate commanders retain sufficient freedom to determine how assigned objectives should be achieved. This relationship creates a form of controlled decentralization rather than simple decentralization.



However, the existence of doctrinal permission for decentralized decision-making does not automatically produce effective mission command. Subordinate autonomy can become counterproductive when commanders lack sufficient information, when organizational structures are rigid, when trust is weak, or when command relationships are unclear. Mission command therefore depends upon a broader organizational environment.

This observation constitutes the central analytical starting point of this study.

Rather than asking simply **what mission command is**, the study asks **why and under what organizational conditions mission command can improve joint operational effectiveness**.

To answer this question, three additional variables are introduced: **command autonomy, information sharing, and organizational adaptability**.

Command autonomy represents the degree to which subordinate commanders possess meaningful authority to make decisions within the boundaries established by superior commanders. Information sharing represents the availability, accessibility, timeliness, and cross-organizational exchange of operationally relevant information. Organizational adaptability refers to the capacity of military organizations to modify structures, processes, roles, and decision-making arrangements in response to changing operational conditions.

The resulting conceptual relationship can be expressed as:

Mission Command → Command Autonomy → Joint Operational Effectiveness

Mission Command → Information Sharing → Joint Operational Effectiveness

Mission Command → Organizational Adaptability → Joint Operational Effectiveness

The three mechanisms may also interact. Greater autonomy is unlikely to generate effective decisions without adequate information; information sharing may have limited value if organizations cannot adapt their decision processes; and organizational adaptability may remain constrained if commanders are not authorized to modify established patterns of action.

Accordingly, the study proposes the following overarching research question:

How does mission command within the Royal Air Force contribute to joint operational effectiveness, and what roles do command autonomy, information sharing, and organizational adaptability play in this relationship?

Three subsidiary questions follow:

1. How does mission command influence command autonomy within joint air operations?
2. How does information sharing facilitate the implementation of mission command?
3. How does organizational adaptability affect the relationship between mission command and joint operational effectiveness?

The study makes three principal contributions. First, it moves the analysis of mission command beyond a purely doctrinal interpretation. Second, it integrates command autonomy, information sharing, and organizational adaptability into a unified analytical framework. Third, it examines



mission command through the specific requirements of joint and multinational air operations rather than treating it as an isolated service-level command philosophy.

2. Theoretical Foundation of Mission Command

2.1 From Command Hierarchy to Decision Distribution

Military command has historically been associated with hierarchy. Hierarchical command provides clear authority, responsibility, accountability, and organizational discipline. It is particularly valuable when decisions involve strategic consequences, scarce resources, political sensitivities, or activities that require synchronized execution across large formations.

However, hierarchy can become problematic when decision-making is excessively concentrated. The higher the decision is elevated within the organizational hierarchy, the greater the potential distance between the decision-maker and the operational environment.

This creates what can be described as the **decision-distance problem**.

A commander located at a higher headquarters may possess greater strategic information but may lack the immediate tactical information required to determine the best course of action. Conversely, a subordinate commander may possess detailed local knowledge but lack the authority to act.

Mission command attempts to reconcile this tension.

The British doctrinal model emphasizes timely decision-making, understanding the superior commander's intent, responsibility among subordinates, and determination to achieve the desired outcome. Earlier editions of UK Defence Doctrine similarly described these elements as enduring characteristics of British mission command. ([GOV.UK Assets](#))

Mission command therefore does not eliminate hierarchy. Instead, it modifies the way hierarchical authority is exercised.

The fundamental principle becomes:

Centralize purpose, coordinate priorities, and distribute appropriate decision authority.

This distinction is particularly important in joint operations because different decisions require different degrees of centralization.

Strategic decisions may require centralized authority.

Operational coordination may require distributed authority.

Tactical execution may require substantial local autonomy.

Consequently, the effectiveness of mission command depends on the ability to determine **which decisions should remain centralized and which decisions should be delegated**.

3. Mission Command and the Royal Air Force

3.1 The RAF within the UK Joint Force

The RAF operates within a broader UK defence system rather than functioning as an autonomous organization. British doctrine places air power within an interconnected national and joint



framework, emphasizing its relationships with other operational domains and multinational partners. JDP 0-30 explicitly describes the interdependence of air power with other operational domains and with multinational and private-sector partners. (GOV.UK)

This organizational context has major implications for mission command.

An RAF commander may need to coordinate simultaneously with:


- joint headquarters;
- land forces;
- maritime forces;
- space capabilities;
- cyber and information capabilities;
- intelligence organizations;
- NATO command structures;
- coalition partners; and
- national authorities.

Consequently, effective mission command requires more than delegation within the RAF. It requires **interoperable decision-making across organizational boundaries**.

This makes information sharing and organizational adaptability central components of the command system.

4. Conceptual Framework

The proposed conceptual model consists of five principal variables.





Command Autonomy
Information Sharing
Organizational Adaptability



Joint Operational Effectiveness

The model assumes that mission command can influence operational effectiveness through both direct and indirect pathways.

5. Command Autonomy as a Mediating Mechanism

5.1 Conceptualization of Command Autonomy

Command autonomy refers to the extent to which subordinate commanders possess the authority and practical freedom to make decisions without requiring continuous approval from higher headquarters.

Autonomy should not be confused with independence.

An autonomous subordinate commander remains accountable to higher command and must operate within established objectives, constraints, rules, and risk boundaries.

The key distinction is therefore between:

independence from command

and

autonomy within command intent.

Mission command seeks the second.

The British doctrine explicitly associates mission command with the freedom of subordinates to act in order to achieve commanders' intent. It also states that commanders determine the extent of delegation according to context and the abilities of their subordinates. ([GOV.UK Assets](#))

This makes autonomy conditional rather than absolute.

5.2 Autonomy and Decision Speed

Decision speed is particularly important in air operations.

Aircraft, missiles, unmanned systems, electronic effects, intelligence events, and rapidly changing threat conditions may create decision windows that are too short for repeated hierarchical authorization.

If every tactical decision requires approval from a distant headquarters, the command system may lose the opportunity to exploit temporary advantages.

Mission command reduces this problem by moving appropriate decisions toward the point of action.



Thus:

Mission Command → Greater Appropriate Autonomy → Faster Decisions → Improved Operational Responsiveness

However, greater autonomy is beneficial only when subordinate commanders possess adequate competence, information, and understanding of higher-level intent.

6. Information Sharing as a Mediating Mechanism

6.1 Information as the Foundation of Distributed Decision-Making

Decentralized decision-making cannot function effectively without access to relevant information.

A subordinate commander who receives authority but lacks information is not genuinely empowered. Such a commander may possess formal autonomy but remain operationally dependent on higher headquarters.

This creates an important distinction between:

formal autonomy

and

functional autonomy.

Functional autonomy requires three conditions:

1. authority to act;
2. sufficient information to understand the environment; and
3. sufficient understanding of higher-level intent.

Therefore, information sharing constitutes a foundational condition of mission command.

NATO joint doctrine has increasingly emphasized interoperability, multi-domain operations, command relationships, and the integration of operational capabilities. The current AJP-01 framework explicitly develops interoperability and multi-domain operations alongside mission command. ([GOV.UK Assets](#))

7. Organizational Adaptability as a Mediating Mechanism

7.1 The Meaning of Organizational Adaptability

Organizational adaptability refers to the ability of a military organization to modify its structures, processes, command relationships, and operational routines in response to changes in its environment.

Modern joint operations are characterized by continuous change.

Threats change.

Communications change.



Available forces change.

Political constraints change.

Information quality changes.

Therefore, an effective command system must be capable of changing without losing coherence.

Mission command facilitates such adaptation because it gives subordinate commanders greater freedom to respond when circumstances differ from those anticipated in the original plan.

British doctrine emphasizes that mission command requires commanders to understand the abilities of subordinates and to adjust the degree of delegation according to context. ([GOV.UK Assets](#))

This implies that organizational adaptability operates at two levels:

Structural adaptability: the ability to modify organizational arrangements.

Behavioral adaptability: the ability of commanders and personnel to modify decisions and actions.

Both are important for joint operational effectiveness.

8. Joint Operational Effectiveness

Joint operational effectiveness should not be reduced to tactical success.

A joint force can achieve individual tactical objectives while failing to produce the intended operational or strategic effect.

Accordingly, this study defines joint operational effectiveness through five dimensions:

1. **Decision effectiveness**
2. **Operational responsiveness**
3. **Cross-domain coordination**
4. **Force resilience**
5. **Achievement of intended operational effects**

These dimensions reflect the broader purpose of joint command and control.

AJP-01 provides the overarching NATO framework for joint operations, while AJP-3.3 specifically addresses the characteristics, roles, missions, organization, and command and control of air operations and the integration of air capabilities with other operational domains. ([GOV.UK](#))

9. Research Propositions

Based on the conceptual framework, the study develops the following propositions.

Proposition 1

Mission command positively contributes to command autonomy when commanders clearly communicate intent, objectives, priorities, and acceptable boundaries of action.

**Proposition 2**

Higher levels of appropriate command autonomy enhance decision speed and operational responsiveness during joint operations.

Proposition 3

Information sharing strengthens the effectiveness of mission command by enabling subordinate commanders to develop a sufficiently accurate understanding of the operational environment.

Proposition 4

Organizational adaptability strengthens the ability of mission command to translate decentralized decision-making into effective operational action.

Proposition 5

Command autonomy, information sharing, and organizational adaptability collectively mediate the relationship between mission command and joint operational effectiveness.

Proposition 6

The effectiveness of mission command depends on achieving an appropriate balance between centralized strategic coordination and decentralized operational decision-making.

10. The Relationship between Centralization and Mission Command

One of the most significant misconceptions concerning mission command is the assumption that it requires the elimination of centralized command.

This interpretation is incorrect.

The British model does not advocate the disappearance of centralized authority. Rather, it seeks to ensure that central authority is used for decisions that genuinely require central coordination while subordinate commanders retain sufficient freedom for decisions that are better made closer to the operational environment.

The appropriate question is therefore not:

Centralization or decentralization?

It is:

Which decisions should be centralized, at what level, and under what conditions should authority be delegated?

This produces a more flexible model:

Strategic level → centralized direction

Operational level → coordinated delegation

Tactical level → contextual autonomy



Such a structure is particularly relevant to joint air operations, where strategic priorities may require centralized coordination while tactical opportunities may disappear within seconds or minutes.

11. Information Sharing and Common Understanding

Information sharing has another important function: it creates **shared understanding**.

Mission command cannot rely solely on written orders.

Subordinate commanders must understand:

- what the higher commander intends;
- why the mission is important;
- what outcome is expected;
- what constraints exist;
- what risks are acceptable;
- how their mission contributes to the wider operation.

Without this understanding, autonomy can produce fragmentation.

With shared understanding, autonomy can produce initiative.

This creates the following relationship:

Information Sharing → Shared Understanding → Better Interpretation of Commander's Intent → More Effective Autonomous Decision-Making

The importance of shared understanding is particularly pronounced in multinational operations.

Different forces may possess different doctrines, terminology, technical systems, organizational cultures, and national restrictions. The British use of NATO terminology and doctrine is therefore particularly relevant to interoperability. The UK terminology supplement emphasizes that common terminology forms a foundation for common understanding and interoperability. ([GOV.UK](#))

12. Organizational Adaptability and Joint Force Resilience

The value of mission command becomes especially visible when the original plan becomes invalid.

A rigid command structure may respond to unexpected events by waiting for a revised order.

An adaptive command structure can respond immediately within the boundaries of established intent.

This is particularly important when:

- communications are degraded;
- headquarters are displaced;



- information is incomplete;
- threats change unexpectedly;
- coalition partners modify their actions;
- operational priorities change.

Organizational adaptability therefore provides the bridge between **doctrine and resilience**.

Mission command establishes the authority to adapt.

Information sharing provides the knowledge required to adapt.

Organizational adaptability provides the institutional capacity to adapt.

Together, these factors enhance the resilience of joint operations.

13. Mission Command in Multinational Operations

The multinational dimension introduces additional complexity.

The RAF frequently operates within structures involving NATO allies and partners. NATO's AJP-01 provides the common framework for Allied joint operations and is designed to enable commanders and staffs from different nations to share a common understanding of how military power is employed. ([GOV.UK](https://gov.uk))

However, interoperability does not automatically guarantee unified decision-making.

Different nations may retain:

- national political restrictions;
- different rules of engagement;
- different authorities for weapons employment;
- different information-sharing restrictions;
- different command cultures.

Consequently, mission command in multinational operations must reconcile two potentially competing requirements:

national control

and

collective operational effectiveness.

This makes clearly defined command relationships essential.

Mission command is therefore most effective when multinational forces establish shared objectives, common terminology, compatible information mechanisms, and clearly defined authorities before operations begin.



14. The RAF and Multi-Domain Integration

The evolution of air power has further expanded the importance of mission command.

Air operations increasingly depend on capabilities outside the traditional air domain.

For example, operational effects may depend upon:

- space-based communications;
- intelligence networks;
- cyber capabilities;
- electronic warfare;
- maritime forces;
- land-based sensors;
- unmanned systems.

JDP 0-30 explicitly identifies the interdependence of air power with other operational domains and with multinational partners. ([GOV.UK](https://gov.uk))

This means that the RAF's future command challenge is not merely to control aircraft.

It is to coordinate **effects across interconnected systems**.

Under these conditions, mission command becomes increasingly important because no single headquarters can continuously understand and control every component of a multi-domain operation.

15. Challenges and Limitations of Mission Command

Mission command also contains significant risks.

15.1 Risk of Fragmented Action

Excessive autonomy may cause subordinate units to optimize local objectives at the expense of broader operational goals.

15.2 Risk of Misinterpretation

If commander intent is unclear, subordinate commanders may interpret the same objective differently.

15.3 Risk of Information Asymmetry

If information is unevenly distributed, autonomous decision-making may produce inconsistent decisions.

15.4 Risk of Inadequate Competence



Mission command assumes capable and professionally educated commanders. Greater autonomy without sufficient competence can increase operational risk.

15.5 Risk of Organizational Resistance

Organizations accustomed to hierarchical control may formally adopt mission command while retaining centralized habits in practice.

This last problem is particularly important.

Mission command is ultimately a behavioral and organizational culture, not simply a written doctrine.

A military organization cannot create effective mission command merely by publishing a directive that authorizes decentralization.

It must develop:

- trust;
- professional competence;
- realistic training;
- shared doctrine;
- interoperable systems;
- appropriate accountability mechanisms.

16. Discussion

The analysis indicates that the relationship between mission command and joint operational effectiveness is multidimensional.

First, mission command creates the institutional basis for subordinate initiative.

Second, command autonomy transforms doctrinal authority into actual decision-making capacity.

Third, information sharing ensures that autonomous decisions remain connected to the wider operational environment.

Fourth, organizational adaptability allows command structures to modify their behavior when conditions change.


Consequently, mission command should be conceptualized not as an isolated variable but as the central component of an interconnected command-and-control ecosystem.

The proposed relationship can therefore be represented as:

Mission Command



Commander's Intent



The proposed model adopts a broader analytical perspective by examining how mission command mechanisms translate into operational effects within a British joint and multinational environment. Rather than centering the analysis on a doctrinal transition between two specific command models, the framework focuses on the relationships among command principles, organizational interaction, information exchange, decision-making, and operational outcomes.

17. Theoretical Implications

The study contributes to military command research in three ways.

First, it demonstrates that mission command should be examined as a **mechanism rather than merely a doctrine**.

Second, it identifies command autonomy, information sharing, and organizational adaptability as complementary mechanisms that explain why mission command may succeed in one organizational environment but produce weaker results in another.

Third, it suggests that the effectiveness of command decentralization is conditional.

Greater decentralization is not necessarily better.

The critical issue is **appropriate decentralization**.

This distinction is particularly important for contemporary military organizations because technological developments may simultaneously increase the amount of available information and the complexity of decision-making.

18. Practical Implications

The analysis provides several implications for joint force development.

First, commanders should define intent rather than prescribe every action.

This creates space for subordinate initiative while maintaining unity of purpose.

Second, delegation should be conditional and adaptive.

The degree of autonomy should reflect mission complexity, information availability, subordinate competence, and operational risk.

**Third, information architecture should support mission command.**

Information systems should not merely transmit orders from higher headquarters downward. They should facilitate the horizontal and vertical exchange required for distributed decision-making.

Fourth, training should emphasize decision-making under uncertainty.

Personnel should repeatedly practice acting when communications are incomplete or when established plans become invalid.

Fifth, multinational interoperability should be treated as a command requirement.

Common terminology, procedures, information standards, and command relationships should be established before operational crises occur.

19. Limitations and Future Research

This study has several limitations.

First, the analysis is primarily grounded in doctrinal and conceptual evidence rather than quantitative measures of operational performance. Accordingly, the relationships identified within the proposed framework represent analytically derived associations that require further validation through empirical investigation and systematically collected operational data.

Second, the RAF represents a specific organizational and national context. The findings should therefore not automatically be generalized to all air forces.

Third, the proposed mediating relationships require further validation through interviews, surveys, wargaming, exercises, and comparative case studies.

Future research could compare the RAF with the Royal Australian Air Force, Royal Canadian Air Force, French Air and Space Force, or other NATO air forces to determine whether different institutional cultures influence the effectiveness of mission command.

Future studies could also investigate the relationship between mission command and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, human-machine teaming, and decision-support systems.

20. Conclusion

The transformation of contemporary warfare has created a fundamental challenge for military command and control: commanders must simultaneously maintain strategic coherence and enable rapid decentralized action.

The British approach to mission command provides an important response to this challenge. UK Defence Doctrine identifies mission command as a form of decentralized decision-making based on clear commander intent, subordinate freedom of action, timely decision-making, mutual trust, and appropriate delegation. ([GOV.UK Assets](#)) For the Royal Air Force, this philosophy is particularly relevant because air power increasingly operates as part of a joint, multinational, and multi-domain system rather than as an isolated service capability. JDP 0-30 explicitly places air power within an interconnected operational environment and recognizes its interdependence with other domains and partners. ([GOV.UK](#))



The central conclusion of this study is that mission command should not be understood as a simple replacement for centralized command. Its value lies in creating an appropriate relationship between centralized direction and decentralized decision-making.

Within this relationship, **command autonomy** provides the authority necessary for initiative; **information sharing** provides the knowledge necessary for informed decision-making; and **organizational adaptability** provides the capacity to modify actions and structures when operational conditions change.

These variables jointly influence **joint operational effectiveness**.

The resulting model can therefore be summarized as:

Mission Command → Command Autonomy + Information Sharing + Organizational Adaptability → Joint Operational Effectiveness.

The significance of this model extends beyond the Royal Air Force. In contemporary joint warfare, no headquarters can possess complete information or continuously control every tactical event. Effective command therefore depends increasingly on the ability to distribute decision-making without distributing purpose.

The most resilient command system is consequently not the one that centralizes every decision, nor the one that decentralizes every decision. It is the system capable of determining **which decisions should remain centralized, which should be delegated, and how the relationship between the two should change as circumstances evolve.**

The RAF and the broader British defence doctrine demonstrate that mission command can provide such a framework when supported by professional trust, shared understanding, interoperable information, adaptive organizations, and clearly defined command relationships. NATO's contemporary joint doctrine likewise places mission command alongside interoperability and multi-domain operations within the broader framework of Allied joint action. ([GOV.UK Assets](#))

Accordingly, the future effectiveness of mission command will depend not simply on doctrinal adoption but on the capacity of military organizations to integrate **authority, information, human judgment, organizational adaptability, and technological capabilities** into a coherent system of distributed decision-making.



Ethical Considerations

Not applicable. This study did not require ethical approval because it does not include human or animal subjects and does not involve any personal or sensitive data.

List of Abbreviations:

(UK): united kingdom; (RAF): Royal Air Force; (MC): Mission Command; (CA): Command Autonomy; (IS): Information Sharing; (OA): Organizational Adaptability; (JOE): Joint Operational Effectiveness;

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All authors contributed equally to the main contributor to this paper. All authors read and approved the final paper.

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